Abstract. A rigorous, automated approach to analyzing fault-tolerance of distributed systems is presented. The method is based on a stream model of computation that incorporates approximation mechanisms. One application is described: a protocol for fault-tolerant m o ving agents.
Introduction
As computers are integrated into systems having stringent fault-tolerance requirements, there is a growing need for practical techniques to establish that these requirements are satis ed. This paper describes such an analysis method. Automated analysis methods address an important need, because informal arguments do not supply the desired level of assurance for critical systems, and practitioners often lack the background needed to construct the formal proofs required by proof-based methods, such as those in ORSvH95,CdR93,PJ94,JJ96,Sch96]. Automated veri cation techniques based on exhaustive exploration of nite statespaces CGL94,Hol91,Kur94,CS96] h a ve made great progress in the last decade. But relatively little work has been done on automated veri cation of faulttolerant software systems, partly because exhaustive search of the state-space of these systems is infeasible in many cases.
This paper discusses a specialized approach to analysis of fault-tolerance properties for distributed systems. It is a novel hybrid of ideas from streamprocessing (or data-ow) models of networks of processes Kah74, Bro87] and abstract interpretation of programs AH87]. An important feature of our approach is its emphasis on communication (rather than state), consistent with the thesis that distributed systems have natural descriptions in terms of communication.
In stream-processing models, each component of a system is represented by an input-output function describing its input/output behavior. For simplicity, w e assume processes communicate only by messages transmitted along unbounded FIFO channels. Behaviors of a system can be determined from input-output functions describing its components by doing a xed-point calculation this provides a clean algorithmic basis for our analysis.
The xed-point calculation produces a graph, called a message ow graph (MFG), representing possible communication behaviors of the system. Each n o d e of the graph corresponds to a component, and each edge is labeled with a description of the sequence of messages sent from the source node to the target node. An exact computation of all possible sequences of messages that might b e sent is generally infeasible. To h e l p m a k e automated analysis feasible, our framework supports exible and powerful approximations, or abstractions, as they are called in the literature on abstract interpretation AH87]. Traditionally, streamprocessing models have n o t incorporated approximations. The approximations in our framework enable compact representation of the highly non-deterministic behavior characteristic of severe failures and also support abstraction from irrelevant aspects of a system's failure-free behavior. The latter re ects a separation of concerns that is crucial for making the fault-tolerance analysis tractable.
A common approach to modeling failures is to treat them as events that occur non-deterministically during a computation (e.g., CdR93,PJ94,LM94]), but this makes it di cult to separate the e ects of failures from other aspects of the system's behavior and, consequently, to model the former more nely than the latter. In particular, one often wants to avoid case analysis corresponding to nondeterminism in a system's failure-free behavior, while case analysis corresponding to di erent c o m binations of failures appears unavoidable in general in automated analysis of fault-tolerance. A failure scenario for a system is an assignment o f component failures to a subset of the system's components. In our approach, each input-output function is parameterized by possible failures in the corresponding component system behavior is analyzed separately for each failure scenario of interest.
In our framework, possible communications (in a given failure scenario) between two components are characterized by approximations of values (the data transmitted in messages), multiplicities (the number of times each v alue is sent), and message orderings (the order in which v alues are sent). Values and multiplicities are approximated using a form of abstract interpretation and a form of symbolic computation. Message orderings are approximated using partial (instead of total) orders.
Our analysis method is implemented in a prototype tool called CRAFT Sto97] . We h a ve used CRAFT to analyze a protocol for fault-tolerant m o ving agents and the Oral Messages algorithm for Byzantine Agreement LSP82] .
A formal presentation of our analysis method, including a semantics and a proof of soundness with respect to that semantics, appears in Sto97]. A discussion of related and future work, including comparisons with the abstraction methods of CGL94,Kur94], can also be found there.
Analysis Method
We start by describing how data is approximated in our framework and then how sets and sequences of messages are approximated. This leads directly to de nitions of MFGs and input-output functions.
Values. As in abstract interpretation, we i n troduce a set AVal of abstract values. Each abstract value represents a set of concrete values. For example, we u s e abstract value N to represent the set of 64-bit numbers. In Section 3, we use abstract value Arb(kcs ms) to represent the concrete values that can be generated using encryption keys in the set kcs and ciphertexts in the set ms.
Abstract values alone capture too little information about relationships between concrete values. For example, consider a system containing a majority voter. The voter's outputs depend on equality relationships among its inputs. If two inputs both have abstract value N, there is no way to tell from this whether they are equal. So, we i n troduce a set SVal of symbolic values, w h i c h are expressions composed of constants and variables. All occurrences of a symbol (i.e., a constant o r v ariable) in a single MFG represent the same value. For example, if two inputs of a 3-way v oter contain the same symbolicvalue, then that symbolic values represents the majority v alue and therefore represents the voter's output.
A constant represents the same value in every execution of a system most constants are typeset in a sans-serif font. The meaning of a constant i s s p e c i e d by a n interpretation, w h i c h maps constants to concrete values. A variable represents values that may be di erent in di erent executions of a system. Variables are useful for modeling outputs that are not completely determined by a component's inputs. Such outputs commonly arise with components that interact with an environment that is not modeled explicitly they also arise when a component's behavior is approximated. Each v ariable is local to a single component, whose outputs in a given execution determine the value represented by that variable. Making each v ariable local to a single component enables independent veri cation that each input-output function faithfully represents the behavior of the corresponding process (as described in Sto97]). We also include in SVal a special wildcard symbol\ ", which i s u s e d w h e n a v alue is not known to have a n y interesting relationships to other values. Di erent occurrences of the wildcard in a M F G d o not necessarily represent the same concrete value.
A symbolicvalue and an abstract value together are often su cient t o c haracterize the possible data in a message. Analysis of a non-deterministic system might yield multiple such pairs, each representing some of the possibilities for the data in a message. So, we use a set of such pairs to represent v alues, and dene Val = Set(SVal AVal)n f g where Set(S) i s t h e p o werset of a set S. Since abstract values are analogous to types, we usually write hs ai 2 SVal AVal as s:a. W e usually omit braces around singleton sets for example, fhX Nig 2 Val may b e written X : N. Since a wildcard is similar in meaning to omission of a symbolic value, we usually elide the wildcard for example, fh Nig 2 Val may be written N.
Multiplicities. Uncertainty i n the number of messages sent during a computation may stem from various sources, including non-determinism of components (especially faulty components), non-determinism of message arrival order, and approximation of values. For example, a component subject to Byzantine failures 1 might emit outputs with an arbitrary multiplicity. T o compactly represent these possibilities, multiplicity (i.e., the number of messages) also needs to be approximated. Thinking of multiplicities as natural numbers suggests representing them in the same way as data. Thus, we de ne Mul = Set(SVal AMul) n f g where the set AMul AVal of abstract multiplicities contains abstract values whose meanings are subsets of the natural numbers, excluding and f0g.
The symbolic values in multiplicities are useful for e cient analysis of systems with crash failures SS97]. Abstract multiplicities are analogous to superscripts in regular expressions. To promote the resemblance, we assume AVal contains the following: 1, denoting f1g ?, denoting f0 1g +, denoting the set of positive natural numbers and , denoting the set of natural numbers. The notational conventions for Val also apply to Mul for example, fh ig 2 Mul may be written .
1
A Byzantine failure causes a component to exhibit arbitrary behavior.
Partially-ordered sets of messages. A set of messages is approximated in our framework by a ms-atom (mnemonic for \message-set atom"). Each ms-atom approximates a set of messages, using an element o f Val to characterize the concrete values in the messages and an element o f Mul to characterize the number of messages (i.e., the cardinality of the set). For example, a ms-atom with value X : N and multiplicity represents a set S of messages such that: (1) the concrete value in each message is an element of (the set represented by) N and is represented by v ariable X (hence all the messages in S contain the same concrete value), and (2) the numb e r o f m e s s a g e s i n S is arbitrary (but nite). Similarly, a ms-atom with value : N and multiplicity represents an arbitrary-sized set of messages, with each message containing a (possibly di erent) element o f N.
A sequence of messages is approximated in our framework by a partiallyordered set (abbreviated as \poset") of ms-atoms. A poset over a set A is a pair hS i, where S A and is an irre exive, transitive, and acyclic binary relation on S. F or a poset hS i of ms-atoms, the meaning of the partial order is: if x y, t h e n during an execution of the system, the messages represented by x would be sent (and received, since channels are FIFO) before the messages represented by y. As a technicality, in order to allow m ultiple ms-atoms with the same value and multiplicity to appear in a poset, we i n c l u d e in each ms-atom a t a g f r o m t h e set Tag. In examples, we take Tag to be the natural numbers. Thus, the signature of ms-atoms is MSA = Val Mul Tag: To promote the resemblance to regular expressions, we usually write an ms-atom hval mul 0i as val mul i f t h e m ultiplicity mul is 1, we usually elide it. Message Flow Graphs. A system comprises a set of named components, with names from the set Name. A system is represented by a function nf 2 Name ! IOF (\nf" is mnemonic for \name to input-output function"). A MFG representing a system's behavior is computed using the function step nf fs (g) = ( y:Name: ( x:Name: nf (x)(fs(x))(g(x))(y))):
(2) Informally, step nf fs (g) i s t h e M F G representing the result of each component i n system nf in failure scenario fs processing its inputs in the possibly-incomplete executions represented by MFG g and producing possibly-extended outputs.
The behavior of a system nf in failure scenario fs is represented by the MFG lfp(step nf fs ), if it exists, where lfp indicates the least xed-point, and the partial ordering on MFG, de ned in Sto97], corresponds informally to the pre x ordering on sequences. This xed-point m i g h t not exist one reason, roughly, i s t h a t MFGs do not have canonical forms Sto97]. The tool searches for a xed-point by starting with the \empty" MFG ( x:Name: y :Name: h i) and repeatedly applying step nf fs . If the xed-point does not exist, this procedure diverges. 2 Fault-Tolerance R equirements. A fault-tolerance requirement is expressed in our framework as a function b such that for each failure scenario fs, b(fs) is a predicate on MFGs. A system satis es fault-tolerance requirement b if, for each f a i l u r e scenario, the MFG computed as a xed-point o f step nf fs satis es b(fs).
Analysis of Fault-Tolerant Moving Agent Protocol
An interesting paradigm for programming distributed systems is moving agents. In this paradigm, an agent m o ves from site to site in a network. For example, an agent that starts at site S might m o ve to site S 1 in order to access some service (e.g., a database) available there. The agent m i g h t then determine that it needs to access a service located at site S 2 and move there. If the agent has gathered all of the information it needs, it might nish by moving to a nal site A to deliver the result of the computation. The sequence of sites visited by a m o ving agent is generally not known when the computation starts, since it may depend on information obtained as the computation proceeds.
Replicated Two-Stage Moving Agent. To illustrate the fault-tolerance problems that arise with moving agents, we consider a \two-stage" moving agent that visits two replicated services. The moving agent starts at a source S, accesses service F, which is replicated at sites F 1 F 2 F 3 , and then accesses service G, which is replicated at sites G 1 G 2 G 3 . S i n c e G is the last service it needs, the agent moves to a consolidator B, w h i c h is responsible for delivering the result of the computation to the destination, or \actuator", A. The consolidator computes the majority of the values it receives and sends the result to the actuator in addition, as discussed below, the consolidator tests validity of received values and excludes invalid values from the vote. The failure-free behavior of this moving agent is represented by t h e M F G i n Figure 1 . Constants F and G represent the processing done by services F and G, respectively. A t ypical moving agent accesses only some of the available services.
To re ect this, the system shown in Figure 1 includes a service H, replicated at sites H 1 {H 3 , w h i c h is not used by this particular agent. The fault-tolerance requirement is:
MA-FTR. Inputs to the actuator should be una ected by Byzantine failure of a minority of the replicas of each service used by the moving agent a n d b y Byzantine failure of any n umber of replicas of each service not used by t h e m o ving agent. Suppose faulty components can spoof (i.e., send messages that appear to be from other components) and eavesdrop (i.e., obtain copies of messages sent to other components). From the perspective o f t h e recipient o f a message, the possibility of spoo ng causes uncertainty about the identity of the actual sender of the message. We model this uncertainty b y using input-output functions that are independent of the names of the senders in the input history.
To eavesdrop on a component x, a faulty component (the \eavesdropper") sends a distinguished value evsdrp to x. The output history of a component t h a t receives evsdrp must allow the possibility of sending copies of all subsequent outputs to the eavesdropper. 3 We assume that a faulty s e r v er is able to eavesdrop on all components except actuators.
Consider the consolidator B in Figure 1 . How does it decide which inputs are valid? One might be tempted to say that B should treat messages from G 1 {G 3 as valid and messages from other components as invalid. This criterion is inappropriate for moving agents, because it assumes B knows in advance that the last service visited by the moving agent will be service G h o wever, the sequence of services visited by a m o ving agent is generally not known in advance.
At the other extreme, suppose B considers all inputs valid: whenever B receive s t h e s a m e v alue from a majority of the replicas of some service, it sends that value to the actuator. (We assume every component knows which service is provided by e a c h server.) It is easy to see that this scheme does not tolerate 3 For this purpose, we allow an exception to the rule in the previous paragraph.
failure of a majority of the replicas of services (e.g., H 1 {H 3 ) not used by the moving agent.
Informally, a message embodying a moving agent should be considered valid if it has visited the same sequence of services as the corresponding failure-free moving agent. We consider here a protocol in which digital signatures are used by the consolidator to determine validity. W e assume digital signatures are implemented using public-key cryptography and that each component knows its own private key and the public key of every other component.
Each message sent by a source or server is signed and augmented with information about the sequence of services that should be visited. Each source or server includes in each outgoing message the name of the \destination", i.e., the next service or consolidator to be visited by the moving agent embodied in that message. A consolidator must verify the entire \history" of the moving agent (i.e., the entire sequence of visited services), so a server x also includes in the outgoing message the incoming message that embodied the arrival of that moving agent a t x b y induction, that incoming message contains the history of the moving agent up to the arrival of the moving agent a t x. The signatures on these recursively included messages provide a chain of evidence documenting the sequence of services actually visited by t h e m o ving agent.
A consolidator tests whether a message is valid by c hecking that it was originated by a (legitimate) source, that the consolidator itself is the declared destination of the message, and that the sequence of declared destinations (obtained from the included messages) are consistent with the chain of signatures on the included messages. Of course, the consolidator also veri es each of the signatures and considers the message invalid if any of those veri cations fail. We s a y a s e t S of messages is valid if: (1) each message in S is valid (2) all the messages in S contain the same sequence of declared destinations (3) the nal signatures on the messages in S are (collectively) from a majority of the replicas of some service.
When the consolidator receives a valid set of messages, those messages should all contain the same data, which the consolidator forwards to the actuator.
To describe this protocol in our framework, we introduce some de nitions.
Let D 2 AVal be the \type" of data carried by m o ving agents. Let Svc Con denote the set of (names of) services that can be accessed by a m o ving agent.
The processing done by a service S 2 Svc is represented by an operator S 2 Con, as in Figure 1 . We assume component names can be used as constant s y m bols, i.e., that Name Con. Let Src Name be the set of names of (legitimate) sources. For x 2 Name, let K x 2 KC represents x's private key (used to sign messages) we assume each component's private key is unique. The set of constants representing private keys is KC = S x2Name K x . To c o n veniently represent messages sent b y sources, we i n troduce a constant msg 0 2 Con with the following interpretation: symbolicvalue msg 0 (k data dest) represents a message signed with key k 2 KC , carrying data represented by symbolic value data, and with destination (either a service or the name of a consolidator) represented by symbolicvalue dest.
To c o n veniently represent messages sent b y servers, we i n troduce a constant msg 2 Con with the following interpretation: symbolicvalue msg(k data dest msg) represents a message signed with key k 2 KC , carrying data represented by s y mbolic value data, with destination (either a service or the name of a consolidator) represented by s y m bolic value dest, and with symbolicvalue msg representing a message that caused the server that received it to send this message. The MFG in Figure 2 shows the behavior of this protocol for the replicated two-stage moving agent described above, using the following abbreviations:
Tolerating Failure of Multiple Visited Services. The above protocol provides some fault-tolerance but does not satisfy MA-FTR. For example, the above protocol does not tolerate simultaneous failure of F 1 and G 2 , because two o f t h e consolidator's three inputs might be corrupted by these failures.
To m a k e t h e m o ving agent more robust, each server sends its outgoing messages to all replicas of the next service, instead of just one, and validity tests and voting are incorporated into each stage of the computation after the rst. The validity test and voting are as just described for consolidators. 4 Thu s , a s e r v er sends messages only after receiving a valid set S of messages to document t h e sequence of services visited by the moving agent, the server includes some message from S in the outgoing messages. 5 The behavior of the revised protocol is shown in Figure 3 . Each server G j might include any one of its three input messages in its output, so the value in its outputs is a set of three possibilities speci cally, t h e v alue is (ms j f Msgg) 2 Val, where ms j = fm2 1 j m 2 2 j m 2 3 j g:
Detailed input-output functions for this protocol appear in Sto97].
Analysis Results
To determine whether the above protocol satis es MA-FTR, an MFG representing the protocol's behavior is computed for each failure scenario in which a 4
The only remaining di erences between a server and a consolidator are: (1) a consolidator does not perform application-speci c computation, i.e., does not apply an operator to the data carried by t h e m o ving agent (2) a consolidator does not include authentication information in its outputs, because the channel between the consolidator and the actuator is assumed to be secure.
5
The reader who wonders whether multiple messages from S should be included in the outgoing messages is referred to the comments in Section 3. Figure 3 , except that the outputs of the faulty components are di erent, and other components send messages to the faulty components as a result of eavesdropping. Speci cally, f o r x 2 f F 1 G 2 g, for y 2 N n f xg, e d g e hx yi is labeled with the ms-atom fevsdrp Arb(fK F1 K G2 g fm0 m 1 2 m 1 3 m 2 2 1 m 2 3 1 m 2 2 3 m 2 3 3 g)g : Arb was described in Section 2. Also, for x 2 f F 1 G 2 g and y 2 N n f F 1 G 2 g, edge hy xi is labeled with all the output ms-atoms of component y in Figure 3 , but with the multiplicities changed to ?.
Failure of Unvisited Servers Only. Consider the failure scenario in which H 1 , H 2 , and H 3 fail. The xed-point computed for this failure scenario is the same MFG as in Figure 3 , except that the outputs of the faulty components are di erent, and other components send messages to the faulty components as a result of eavesdropping. Speci cally, f o r x 2 f H 1 H 2 H 3 g, f o r y 2 N n f xg, e d g e hx yi is labeled with the ms-atom fevsdrp Arb(fK H1 K H2 K H3 g i j2f1 2 3g fm0 m 1 i m 2 i j g)g :
Also, for x 2 f H 1 H 2 H 3 g and y 2 N n f H 1 H 2 H 3 g, e d g e hy xi is labeled with all the output ms-atoms of component y in Figure 3 , but with the multiplicities changed to ?.
Failure of Visited and Unvisited Servers. Consider the failure scenario in which F 1 , H 1 , and H 2 fail. As the reader may have suspected, the protocol violates MA-FTR in this failure scenario. Tracing the rst three iterations of the xedpoint computation shows why. D u e to space limitations, we omit those MFGs and describe the behavior informally. F 1 includes m0 in a signed message m 0 with declared destination H and carrying arbitrary data and sends m 0 to H 1 and H 2 , who each include m 0 in a signed message with declared destination B and carrying the same (but otherwise arbitrary) data and send that message to B. These two messages cause the consolidatorto send arbitrary data to the actuator. One way to x the protocol is to have s e r v ers include in each o u t p u t message input messages from a majority of the replicas of some service. The analysis of the corrected protocol is similar to the analysis sketched here.
